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SMITH V. CITY OF JACKSON: A PRETEXT OF VICTORY FOR
EMPLOYEES
INTRODUCTION
Age discrimination plagues many older workers in America today.'
Recent studies reveal that while companies purport to value older em-
ployees, they often discriminate against older workers in their hiring,
2training, and employment practices. In 2004, workers submitted 17,837
age discrimination charges to the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC), which represented a 26% increase from 1999.3 Fur-
thermore, in a 2005 survey of working Americans, 20% reported over-
hearing age-biased comments in their workplace.4
Age discrimination causes unnecessary loss in productivity and de-
pletion of social insurance, unemployment, and welfare programs.5 As
Lyndon B. Johnson so eloquently stated in urging Congress to adopt leg-
islation to prohibit age.discrimination, "in economic terms, [arbitrary age
discrimination] is a serious - and senseless loss to a nation on the move.
But the greater loss is the cruel sacrifice of happiness and well-being,
which joblessness imposes on these citizens and their families."6
Striving to protect older workers from age discrimination in the
workplace, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
1. Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Thirty: Where it's Been,
Where it is Today, Where it's Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 670-72 (1997).
2. Id.
3. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT (ADEA) CHARGES: FY 1992-FY 2004 (2005), http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/adea.
html (does not reflect settlements, withdrawals, or other administrative closures); cf Eglit, supra
note 1, at 669 n.230 (recognizing that the significant numbers of age discrimination charges filed
with the EEOC may or may not indicate prevalence of age bias in employment today. The EEOC
dismisses a large number of these claims. However, many dismissed claims might have merit but
the EEOC chooses not to pursue them due to lack of resources). See generally Gary Minda, Oppor-
tunistic Downsizing of Aging Workers: The 1990s Version of Age and Pension Discrimination in
Employment, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 511, 513-14 (1997) (arguing that current popular employment
practice of downsizing vulnerable late-career employees who cannot easily transfer skills to other
potential employers should be considered illegal age discrimination).
4. Hubert B. Herring, There's No Shortage of Intolerance in the Workplace, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 2005, § 3 (Business), at 2 (citing 2005 phone survey conducted by Novations/J. Howard &
Associates of 623 randomly selected working Americans).
5. See BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW 4, 34 (2003); see also Michael Evan Gold, Disparate Impact Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 8 (2004) (citing U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 18
(1965) [hereinafter WIRTZ REPORT] (report of the Secretary of Labor to Congress under section 715
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)).
6. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 5, at 7 (quoting Lyndon B. Johnson, in PUB. PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS, Book 1, 32, 37 (1968)). See generally Eglit, supra note 1, at 670-72 (age stereo-
types may affect managerial decisions and result in negative consequences for older employees such
as lowered motivation, career stagnation, and eventual career obsolescence).
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(ADEA).7 For decades, courts interpreted the ADEA equivalently to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) which prohibits dis-
crimination based on race, sex, religion, color, and national origin.
8
Courts reasoned that because Congress enacted both statutes to combat
discrimination, and used the same prohibitory language in both statutes,
the statutes should be similarly construed. 9
Therefore, like Title VII plaintiffs, older workers were initially able
to utilize two different avenues to combat age discrimination under the
ADEA: disparate treatment and disparate impact.10 However, after the
Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,II some circuits
began to reject disparate impact claims under the ADEA. 12 Finally, in
Smith v. City of Jackson, 13 the Court resolved the circuits' split and held
that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA.14
Part I of this Comment presents a background of the applicable leg-
islation and case law preceding Smith. Part II summarizes the Smith de-
cision. Part III provides a critical analysis of Smith, including the unfor-
tunate but likely ramifications of this case. This Comment will argue
that the Court's affirmation of a disparate impact theory of recovery un-
der the ADEA is only an ostensible victory for older workers. In actual-
ity, the Court's narrow construction of employer liability, by its interpre-
tation of employer defenses and its redistribution of burdens of proof,
threatens the viability of disparate impact claims altogether. In addition,
the Court's restrictive interpretation of disparate impact claims under the
ADEA jeopardizes the main purpose of the ADEA: to protect older
workers from arbitrary age discrimination.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The ADEA arose out of a 1965 report (Wirtz Report), requested by
Congress and compiled by the Secretary of Labor regarding age dis-
crimination.' 5 The Wirtz Report discussed different types of age-based
discrimination and the extent of each type.16 The Secretary of Labor
7. Judith J. Johnson, Rehabilitate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Resuscitate
the "Reasonable Factors Other than Age" Defense and the Disparate Impact Theory, 55 HASTINGS
L.J. 1399, 1400 (2004).
8. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1542-43 (2005).
9. J. Johnson, supra note 7, at 1402.
10. See Douglas C. Herbert & Lani Schweiker Shelton, A Pragmatic Argument Against Ap-
plying the Disparate Impact Doctrine in Age Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEx. L. REv. 625, 632-33
(1996). See generally discussion infra Part 1B (providing explanation of disparate impact and dispa-
rate treatment claims).
11. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
12. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1543.
13. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
14. Id. at 1537.
15. Id. at 1540.
16. Gold, supra note 5, at 6-8.
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found that discrimination based on dislike or intolerance of older indi-
viduals was not a significant problem. 17  Conversely, arbitrary age dis-
crimination based on mistaken assumptions about the effect of age on
ability was a serious issue.18 Finally, the Wirtz Report explained that age
discrimination sometimes stems from institutional arrangements which
needlessly restrict the employment of older workers.' 9 For example, a
hiring policy requiring a high school diploma might unnecessarily elimi-
nate an older applicant with years of work experience that would be con-
sidered equivalent to a high school education.2°
The Secretary of Labor also reported on the deleterious economic
effects of age discrimination. 2 1 The Secretary stressed that denying older
workers employment opportunities wastes valuable human resources.22
Specifically, rough calculations showed that, at that time, the Nation's
economy was losing billions of dollars per year due to lost productivity
from individuals forced to retire involuntarily.23 Additionally, the Wirtz
Report noted that the high unemployment rate of older workers and the
resulting drain on unemployment insurance programs were serious eco-
nomic problems.24
Congress responded to the Wirtz Report findings by passing the
ADEA in 1967.25 The ADEA applies to persons over the age of forty
and makes it unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other-
wise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employ-
ees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's age.
26
However, the ADEA provides four exceptions to employers' liability:
(1) where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business (BFOQ);
or (2) where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other
than age (RFOA); (3) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority
system not intended to evade the purposes of this chapter ... or...
17. Id. at 6-7 (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 5).
18. Id. at 6-8.
19. Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1540 (2005) (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note
5, at 15).
20. Id. at 1541 n.5 (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 5, at 21).
21. See Gold, supra note 5, at 8 (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 5, at 18).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 8.
24. Id.
25. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1540.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2) (2004).
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employee benefit plan; (4) to discharge or otherwise discipline an in-
dividual for good cause.
27
B. Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact Claims
Two distinct theories of recovery exist in discrimination law.28 The
first, disparate treatment, refers to an employer's action against an indi-
vidual because of the individual's protected characteristic and requires
discriminatory intent. 29 The second, disparate impact, refers to an em-
ployer's practice or policy which is facially neutral and involves no dis-
criminatory intent, but disproportionately affects a protected class of
employees.30 Disparate treatment claims are cognizable under both Title
VII and the ADEA, 31 and the Court interpreted Title VII to cover dispa-
rate impact claims.3 But, until the recent decision of Smith, the Court
had not addressed whether a disparate impact theory is available under
the ADEA.3 3
C. Disparate Impact Claims Under Title VII
Generally, courts follow judicial interpretation of Title VII to inter-
pret ADEA disparate impact claims. 34  Therefore, to provide a back-
ground of ADEA disparate impact claims, this Section summarizes the
progression of the disparate impact theory of recovery under Title VII.
The Supreme Court initially articulated the disparate impact theory in a
Title VII case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,35 and then refined the theory
in another Title VII case, Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio.36 Finally, in
response to the Court's decision in Wards Cove, Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, codifying disparate impact claims under Title
VII.
7
1. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
Griggs, decided four years after the enactment of the ADEA, was
the first case in which the Court expressly recognized disparate impact
claims under Title VII.38 In Griggs, an employer allegedly discriminated
27. § 623(O(1)-(3).
28. Brett Ira Johnson, Six of One, Half-Dozen of Another: Mullin v. Raytheon Co. as a Rep-
resentative of Federal Circuit Courts Erroneously Distinguishing the ADEA from Title VII Regard-
ing Disparate Impact Liability, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 303, 304-06 (2000).
29. Id. at 305.
30. Id. at 306.
31. Id. at 305.
32. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1541.
33. Id. at 1539.
34. See James C. Bailey, Age Discrimination Models of Proof After Hazen Paper Co. v. Big-
gins, 9 ELDER L.J. 175, 179 (2001).
35. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
36. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
37. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45.
38. Jennifer J. Clemons & Richard A. Bales, ADEA Disparate Impact in the Sixth Circuit, 27
OnoN.U. L. REv. 1, 8 (2000).
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against African American employees by requiring a high school diploma
and a passing grade on a standardized test as a condition of hire or trans-
fer.39 Although the Court accepted that the employer had no intent to
discriminate, the Court held that because the requirements were not cor-
related with job performance, disqualified African Americans at a higher
rate than whites, and perpetuated the employer's historical preferential
hiring of whites, the employer was nevertheless liable. 40 The Court ex-
plained that good faith (or lack of intent to discriminate) "does not re-
deem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring
job capability." '
Furthermore, the Griggs Court introduced the concept of "business
necessity" as the touchstone and limiting principle of the disparate im-
pact doctrine. The Court stated that if an employer cannot show that its
challenged employment practice is related to job performance (or a busi-
ness necessity), then it is prohibited under Title VII.
43
2. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
After the monumental decision in Griggs, a significant amount of
case law followed which struggled with the disparate impact doctrine,
the business necessity defense, and the burdens of proof for plaintiffs and
defendants in disparate impact cases. 44 The Supreme Court endeavored
to resolve these issues in its Wards Cove decision.45
In Wards Cove, salmon cannery workers brought suit against their
former employer under Title VII alleging that its hiring and promotion
policies adversely affected non-white employees and constituted racial
discrimination.46 The Court held that the plaintiff must identify specific
employment practices responsible for creating the alleged disparate im-
pact.47 Then, the employer may produce evidence of a business justifica-
tion (rather than business necessity) for the employment practices.48 But,
the plaintiff may still prevail by showing that the employer could have
used an alternative practice with less discriminatory effects.49
The Court held that the burden of persuasion remains at all times
with the plaintiff.50 This holding conflicted with the Court's own (and
39. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426-28.
40. Id. at 430-33.
41. Id. at 432.
42. Id. at 431.
43. Id.
44. See Herbert & Shelton, supra note 10, at 630.
45. See id.
46. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 647-48.
47. Id. at 659.
48. See id
49. See id. at 660-6 1.
50. Id. at 659.
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other federal courts') procedural treatment of the business necessity de-
fense as an affirmative defense with the burden of persuasion on the de-
fendant.5' Furthermore, the Court noted that an employer need not pro-
duce evidence that the challenged practice is "essential" or "indispensa-
ble" to the employer's business for it to qualify as a business justification
(as opposed to business necessity).: Finally, the Court implied that, in
order for the plaintiff to prevail upon showing of an alternative practice
with less discriminatory impact, employers needed to have been aware of
the alternative practice and rejected it.
53
3. Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Court's narrow construction of employer liability in Wards
Cove sparked considerable criticism from Congress and led to the
amendment of Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 amend-
ments).54 The 1991 amendments codified and clarified disparate impact
claims under Title VII,55 and restored the plaintiff and defendant burdens
articulated in Griggs.6 First, the 1991 amendments allowed a plaintiff to
allege that an employer's decision-making process (as a whole) causes a
disparate impact if the plaintiffs could not isolate specific employment
practices.57 Second, the 1991 amendments incorporated the business
necessity defense from Griggs rather than the more lenient business justi-
fication test from Wards Cove.58 Third, the 1991 amendments stated that
the employer retained the burden of proof and persuasion to establish the
business necessity defense. 59 Notably, the 1991 amendments to Title VII
did not include any amendment to the ADEA nor mention age discrimi-
nation,6° which is a frequently cited fact in the debate about the scope of
ADEA disparate impact claims.6'
D. Disparate Impact Claims Under the ADEA
After the Court announced the disparate impact theory as a method
for proving discrimination under Title VII in Griggs, courts consistently
recognized disparate impact claims under the ADEA.62 Similarly, courts
51. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 668-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 659 (majority opinion).
53. See Herbert & Shelton, supra note 10, at 631.
54. See id.
55. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545.
56. See Robert A. Robertson, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Congress Provides Guidelines for
Title VII Disparate Impact Cases, 3 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 1, 47-48 (1992) (citing 137
CONG. REC. S15273 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991)).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(i) (2005).
58. See § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i); Herbert & Shelton, supra note 10, at 631 (citing Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 3 (codified in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981)).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2005).
60. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545.
61. See id. at 1544-45. See also infra Section IVB (discussing the effect of Wards Cove on
ADEA disparate impact claims).
62. See Smith. 125 S. Ct. at 1543.
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applied the 1991 amendments of Title VII to the ADEA, including the
business necessity defense and the shifting burdens of proof.63 However,
after the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,64 the
circuits split over whether the ADEA covered disparate impact claims.65
1. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins
In Hazen Paper, the plaintiff, age 62, alleged he was fired to pre-
vent his pension from vesting and brought suit for age discrimination
under the ADEA. 66 The Court held that because the employer's motiva-
tion for termination was the employee's years of service, not his age, the
employee failed to state a claim of disparate treatment under the
67ADEA. The Court explained that disparate treatment "captures the
essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA. It is the very
essence of age discrimination for an older employee to be fired because
the employer believes that productivity and competence decline with old
age. ' 68 The Court reasoned that when an employer's decision is based
on factors other than age, the problem of inaccurate stereotypes disap-
pears.69
In dicta, the Court expressly stated it was not deciding whether dis-
parate impact claims are recognized under the ADEA.70  However, a
concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy mentioned the ADEA may not
cover disparate impact claims.71
2. Turmoil Created by Hazen Paper
Despite the Court's unambiguous statement in Hazen Paper that its
decision did not address disparate impact claims under the ADEA, many
circuits interpreted Hazen Paper as precluding disparate impact claims
under the ADEA.72 Yet, other circuits continued to recognize disparate
impact claims under the ADEA73 and some circuits remained undecided
on the issue.74
Circuits which continued to recognize disparate impact claims
stressed the similarities between the ADEA and Title VII and pointed to
the express language in Hazen Paper, stating that the Court was not de-
63. See LINDEMANN & KADuE, supra note 5, at 427-28.
64. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
65. See B. Johnson, supra note 28, at 316.
66. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 606-07.
67. Id. at 610-12.
68. Id. at 610.
69. Id. at 611.
70. Id. at 610.
71. Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
72. See, e.g., Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir. 1996).
73. See, e.g., Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1999).
74. See, e.g., Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1048 (6th Cir. 1998) (stat-
ing in dicta that this court is unsure as to whether disparate impact theory is cognizable under the
ADEA after Hazen Paper).
2005]
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ciding on the issue of disparate impact claims. 75 For example, in Smith v.
Xerox Corp. ,76 the Second Circuit, citing Griggs, held that disparate im-
pact claims targeting employment practices which are "fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation" are recognized under the ADEA.77 Xerox
involved fifteen former employees who alleged disparate impact and
disparate treatment discrimination claims under the ADEA after being
laid off during a reduction in force (RIF).78 Although the employees did
not provide sufficient evidence that the RIF process adversely affected
older employees, as compared to other employees,79 the court clearly
stated that the Second Circuit recognized disparate impact claims despite
the Hazen Paper holding and other circuits' decisions to reject such
claims.8°
In contrast, circuits rejecting such claims argued that the holding in
Hazen Paper, allowing employers to rely on factors correlated with age,
precluded disparate impact claims.8 Furthermore those circuits con-
cluded that the statutory language, the legislative history, and Congress's
1991 amendments to Title VII all pointed to the differences between the
ADEA and Title VII and Congress's intention to prohibit disparate im-
pact claims under the ADEA.82
For example, the Tenth Circuit held that disparate impact claims are
not cognizable under the ADEA in Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc.8 3 In
Ellis, two flight attendants alleged that the airline's height and weight
requirements adversely affected older workers and, therefore, constituted
age discrimination under a disparate impact theory.84 The court recog-
nized that Hazen Paper left the question of disparate impact under the
ADEA open.85 However, the court's own interpretation of the text, legis-
lative history, and congressional intent of the ADEA combined with the
Court's language in Hazen Paper, supported its decision not to recognize
disparate impact claims. 86 Thus, because the circuits were split over the
recognition of ADEA disparate impact claims, the issue was ripe for
resolution by the Supreme Court. In Smith, the Court granted certiorari
to decide this issue.
87
75. See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 367 (1999).
76. 196 F.3d 358, 358 (1999).
77. Smith, 196 F.3d at 364.
78. Id. at 363.
79. Id. at 368-69.
80. Id. at 367 n.6.
81. See Herbert & Shelton, supra note 10, at 636.
82. See id. at 636-49.
83. 73 F.3d 999, 1009-10 (1 0th Cir. 1996).
84. See id. at 1005-06.
85. Id. at 1007.
86. See id. at 1006-09.
87. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1540.
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II. SMITH V. CITY OF JACKSON
88
A. Facts
On October 1, 1998, the City of Jackson, Mississippi (City) updated
its wage structure to institute pay increases for all employees.89 The City
implemented the new wage structure to ensure that entry-level salaries of
police department employees were competitive with the average market
wage for similar positions in the region.90 Specifically, the plan revision
identified five distinct positions and a wage range for each position based
on a survey of analogous positions in similar Southeastern communi-
ties. 91 The City divided each wage range into a series of steps and as-
signed each employee to a step which was the lowest step to give the
individual at least a two percent raise.92
While most officers occupied the three lowest positions which con-
tained both officers under and over forty, the few officers in the two
highest positions were all over forty. 93 The officers in the highest posi-
tions received raises which, while larger in dollar amount, were propor-
tionately smaller compared with the raises granted to the younger offi-
cers. 94 Statistical evidence showed 66.2% of officers under forty re-
ceived raises of more than 10%, compared to only 45.3% of those over
forty.95 Also, the average percentage increase for officers with less than




A group of police officers filed suit against the City under the
ADEA in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
alleging: (1) the City deliberately discriminated against them because of
their age (disparate treatment); and (2) the older officers were adversely
affected by the wage plan (disparate impact).97 The District Court
granted summary judgment to the City on both claims, and the officers
appealed.98 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the ruling on the
disparate treatment claim, allowing petitioners to proceed with discovery
regarding intent.99 However, the majority affirmed the dismissal of the
disparate impact claim, holding that disparate impact claims are not cog-
88. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
89. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1539.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1545.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1545-46.
95. Id. at 1546.
96. Id.
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nizable under the ADEA. l00 The majority noted, though, that the alleged
facts would have entitled the petitioners to relief under a disparate impact
theory if such a theory had been available.'0 l The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the ADEA authorizes disparate
impact claims. 102
C. Majority/ Plurality
In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Stevens and joined in con-
currence by Justice Scalia, the Court concluded that disparate impact
claims are cognizable under the ADEA.10 3 However, the Court held that
the petitioners failed to present sufficient facts to support their disparate
impact claim. 104
The plurality considered the text and legislative history of the
ADEA to support the conclusion that the ADEA authorizes disparate
impact claims. 0 5 The plurality also utilized the Hazen Paper Co. v. Big-
gins'0 6 decision, the reasonable factor other than age (RFOA) provision,
and the agency interpretation of the ADEA in its reasoning. 0 7 In addi-
tion to finding that the ADEA authorizes disparate impact claims, the
plurality clarified the scope of employer liability in ADEA disparate im-
pact cases, and identified the proper test for the RFOA defense, 
0 8
In examining the text of the ADEA, the plurality highlighted §
623(a)(2) of the ADEA, which prohibits employers' actions that "deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's ... age."' 1 9 The
plurality noted that the language of § 623(a)(2) is identical to that of §
703(a)(2) of Title VII with the exception of the word "age" rather than
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 10 The plurality relied on
the presumption that because these two provisions are equivalent, Con-
gress intended the language to have the same meaning in both statutes;' 1
and the Court's interpretation of the same language to permit disparate
impact claims under Title VII suggests that the Court should likewise
recognize disparate impact claims under the ADEA." 12 Additionally, the
100. Id. at 1539-40.
101. See id. at 1540.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1546. Justice Scalia joined the four justice plurality in all but one part of the opin-
ion. Where Justice Scalia joined the plurality, I will refer to the "Court." However, in the part of the
opinion in which Justice Scalia differed from the plurality, I will refer to the "plurality."
104. Id. at 1540.
105. Id. at 1540-44.
106. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
107. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1543-44.
108. See id at 1543-46.
109. Id. at 1542 (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2000)).
110. Seeid.
Ill. Id. at 1541.
112. Id. at 1542.
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plurality explained that the text of § 623(a)(2) highlights the effects of
the action, rather than the employer's intent underlying the action, which
also supports recognition of disparate impact claims." 
3
The plurality also traced the legislative history and congressional
purpose behind the ADEA to support its recognition of disparate impact
claims. The plurality stressed the Wirtz Report findings that age dis-
crimination arises predominantly from arbitrary discrimination, rather
than animus;' 1 4 and that certain institutional practices may adversely
affect older workers.' 15 In addition, the plurality acknowledged that, like
the Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 116 opinion, the Wirtz Report recognized
that formal employment standards not related to job performance may
adversely impact racial minorities and older workers."
7
The plurality distinguished Hazen Paper v. Biggins, reiterating that
the Court in that case expressly stated it was not deciding whether dispa-
rate impact claims were available under the ADEA.II 8 Furthermore, the
plurality addressed the confusion in the lower courts surrounding the
reasonable factor other than age (RFOA) provision of the ADEA. '1 The
Court explained that for the RFOA clause to have any effect, disparate
impact claims must be recognized. 20 Otherwise, the RFOA provision
would be superfluous when used in tandem with § 623(a)(1) (disparate
treatment claims).12 1 Because, according to Hazen Paper, an employer
acting on any factor other than age would not be liable.' 22 However, the
plurality explained, the RFOA provision serves to protect employers who
would otherwise be liable under § 623(a)(2) if the employer based the
challenged practice on a reasonable non-age factor.'
23
The plurality also referred to regulations of the Department of La-
bor (DOL) and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to
support its holding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the
ADEA. 124  Both the Department of Labor, which drafted the initial
ADEA legislation, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the agency designated by Congress to oversee the implementa-




114. Id. at 1540 (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 5, at 22).
115. Id. (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 5, at 15).
116. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
117. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1541 n.5.
118. Id. at 1543.
119. Id.
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Next, the Court12 6 discussed the more narrow scope of disparate im-
pact liability for employers under the ADEA compared to under Title
VII, focusing on the RFOA provision and Congress's 1991 Amendments
to Title V1.127 The Court noted that the RFOA clause, not found in Title
VII, served to limit the coverage of the ADEA by permitting "otherwise
prohibited [employer] actions" which are "based on reasonable factors
other than age."'
' 28
Additionally, the Court noted that while Congress amended Title
VII to revise the Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio1 29 decision, Congress did
not similarly amend the ADEA.' 30 So, the Court reasoned that the Wards
Cove analysis, which allocates additional procedural burdens on the
plaintiff, remains applicable to the ADEA. 131 According to the Court, the
combination of the RFOA provision and the application of the Wards
Cove interpretation serves to narrow the scope of employer liability un-
der the ADEA in comparison to Title VII.
132
The Court reasoned that the more narrow scope of employer liabil-
ity under the ADEA follows from historical differences between age
discrimination and discrimination of protected classes under Title VII.
33
The Court discussed the fact that age is often relevant to an individual's
capacity to perform his or her job.' 34 Additionally, the Court explained
that certain common employment criteria may be reasonable despite their
adverse impact on older workers. 35 Finally, the Court noted that inten-
tional age discrimination "has not occurred at the same levels as dis-
crimination against those protected by Title VII.'
13 6
The Court demonstrated how to apply the RFOA provision by dis-
tinguishing it from the business necessity test. 37  The Court focused
solely on determining whether an employer's decision to adopt the chal-
lenged employment practice was based on a reasonable factor other than
126. The plurality joined by Justice Scalia.
127. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45.
128. Id. at 1540-41.
129. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
130. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545.
131. Id. According to Wards Cove, plaintiffs in disparate impact cases must first "isolat[e] and
identify[] the specific employment practice ... allegedly responsible" for creating the adverse im-
pact on the protected class. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988). Additionally, plaintiff must bear the burden of persuasion at all
times even regarding an employer's defense of the challenged practice. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at
659. Placing these additional burdens on plaintiffs results in decreasing employers' potential for
liability in disparate impact cases. The Smith Court refers to this effect as narrowing the scope of
employer liability. See Smith, 125 S. Ct, at 1544-45. For a complete discussion of the effect of
applying the Wards Cove plaintiff burdens in the ADEA context see infra Part IIIB.
132. Smith. 125 S. Ct. at 1545; see also supra note 131 and accompanying text.




137. See id. at 1546.
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age.138  If so, the Court stated, the employer is not liable under the
ADEA.139 The Court stressed that this reasonableness test, unlike the
business necessity test, does not require inquiry into whether the em-
ployer could achieve its goals in another manner with less adverse im-
pact on older employees.1
40
In the instant case, the Court held that although the officers pre-
sented evidence of a wage plan which was less generous to older work-
ers, they did not identify specific employment practices responsible for
statistical disparities, as required by Wards Cove.'41 Additionally, the
disparate impact caused by the City's plan was based on what the Court
considered to be reasonable factors other than age: seniority and posi-
tion. 142 The Court explained that seniority and position are reasonable
given the City's need to raise employees' salaries to match those in sur-
rounding communities to meet its retention goal. 43 While the City may
have met its stated goal in another way with less impact on older officers,
the plurality found the City's chosen method was reasonable. 44 The
Court noted that the RFOA test does not require further inquiry into less
discriminatory alternatives that the City might have pursued to achieve
its goal of retaining employees.
45
D. Concurrence of Justice Scalia
The plurality held that disparate impact claims are cognizable under
the ADEA by focusing on the text and legislative history of the
ADEA. 146 Justice Scalia agreed that the ADEA covers disparate impact
claims, but differed from the plurality in his reasoning. 147 Justice Scalia
also joined in the plurality's interpretation of the RFOA provision and
agreed with the plurality's judgment in favor of the City.1
48
Justice Scalia reasoned that ADEA disparate impact claims are cog-
nizable under the ADEA because of agency deference principles. 49 In-
deed, Justice Scalia exclaimed that this case is an "absolutely classic case
for deference to agency interpretation. ' 5  Justice Scalia explained that









146. Id. at 1540-44.
147. See id. at 1546-47 (Scalia, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 1546-49.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 1546 (citing Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
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charged with rule making authority under the ADEA. 15 1 Therefore, Jus-
tice Scalia argued, because the EEOC reasonably interprets the ADEA to
cover disparate impact claims, the Court must recognize disparate impact
claims under the ADEA.1
52
To support his claim that the EEOC interprets the ADEA to cover
disparate impact claims, Justice Scalia cited EEOC regulation 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.7(d) (2004).153 Section 1625.7(d) states that when an employ-
ment practice has an adverse impact on individuals within the protected
age group, and is claimed by the employer to be based on "a factor other
than age," it can only be justified as a business necessity. 54 According
to Justice Scalia, that regulation combined with the EEOC's subsequent
interpretation of that regulation, and its numerous court appearances, all
confirm the EEOC's position that the ADEA encompasses disparate im-
pact claims.'55 Furthermore, Justice Scalia argued that this EEOC inter-
pretation is "eminently reasonable" based on the reasoning in the plural-
ity opinion.'5 6 Thus, Justice Scalia concluded, the reasonable interpreta-
tion of the EEOC itself is enough to support the finding that disparate
impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA. 1
57
E. Concurrence of Justice O'Connor, with Justices Kennedy and Thomas
Like Justice Scalia, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy
and Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment for the City. 58 However,
unlike Justice Scalia and the plurality, Justice O'Connor, along with Jus-
tices Kennedy and Thomas, argued that disparate impact claims are not
cognizable under ADEA. 159 First, Justice O'Connor focused on the text
of § 623(a)(2), specifically the phrase "because of ... age" and inter-
preted it to mean that an employer is only liable for its adverse action
which is motivated by an individual's age (i.e. disparate treatment). 60 In
addition, Justice O'Connor took exception to the plurality's opinion that
the RFOA provision confirms disparate impact claims and instead con-
sidered it to offer employers "an independent safe harbor from liabil-
ity.
'161
Justice O'Connor noted that the legislative history of the ADEA,
which highlights the qualitative differences between age discrimination
and other types of discrimination, actually supports her interpretation that
151. Id.
152. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1547 (Scalia, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 1546-47.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1547.
156. Id. at 1549.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1560 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 1549.
160. Id. at 1550.
161. Id. at 1551.
[Vol. 83:1
SMITH V. CITY OF JACKSON
disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the ADEA. 162 In addi-
tion, Justice O'Connor interpreted the language "arbitrary discrimina-
tion" in the Wirtz Report as intentional discrimination (implicating only
disparate treatment claims). 163 Further, Justice O'Connor argued that
Congress intended the non-coercive measures prescribed by the ADEA,
such as programs to increase available positions and continuing educa-
tion, to be the sole means to address disparate impact age discrimina-
tion.' 64
Justice O'Connor rejected the plurality's presumption that the lan-
guage in the ADEA, mirroring the language in Title VII, should be inter-
preted similarly. 165 Justice O'Connor noted that because the Griggs de-
cision preceded the ADEA's creation, Congress could not have intended
a disparate impact interpretation in using language from Title VII in the
ADEA. 166 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor stated that when two statutes
have similar language, they should be interpreted consistently only in the
absence of contrary congressional intent; and between Title VII and the
ADEA, such contrary congressional intent does exist.1 67 Finally, Justice
O'Connor argued that the EEOC interpretation cited by the plurality and
Justice Scalia was an interpretation of the RFOA clause, not the prohibi-
tory section of the ADEA and, thus, irrelevant to the issue before the
Court.168
Despite Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas' objections, the
remaining five justices in Smith decided to recognize disparate impact
claims under the ADEA. 169 Additionally, the Court applied a new and
more expansive interpretation of the RFOA defense to such claims under
the ADEA. 170 Finally, the Court held that its Wards Cove analysis ap-




The Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. City of Jackson172 to rec-
ognize disparate impact claims under the ADEA was long overdue to
resolve the confusion pervading the lower courts in the wake of Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins.173 However, while the Court in Smith claimed to
merely narrow employer liability under ADEA disparate impact claims
162. Id. at 1552.
163. Id. at 1552-55.
164. Id. at 1554-55.
165. Id. at 1556-57.
166. Id. at 1556.
167. Id. at 1556-57.
168. Id. at 1557-60.
169. Id. at 1540 (majority opinion).
170. Id. at 1543-44, 1546.
171. Id. at 1545.
172. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
173. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
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compared to Title VII disparate impact claims,174 in reality a disparate
impact theory of recovery could all but disappear under the ADEA as a
result of the Smith decision. The lengthy rhetoric of the plurality and
Justice O'Connor in Smith seeking to rationalize their opposing argu-
ments about disparate impact claims was a moot exercise because the
end result of this case, and virtually all future cases of disparate impact
claims under ADEA will be the same: the employee will be unable to
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. In the unlikely event an
employee does establish a prima facie case, the employer will have a
justification under the broad reasonable factor other than age (RFOA)
exception. In addition, reverting to the plaintiff burdens set forth in
Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio'75 will further ensure the eradication of
the employee's disparate impact claim. Thus, older employees will be
left without adequate protection from the inherently discriminatory prac-
tices that purportedly motivated the Court's decision in Smith and Con-
gress's enactment of the ADEA.
This section will present a critical analysis of the Smith holding, fo-
cusing on the Court's over-expansive interpretation of the RFOA provi-
sion and its unfortunate decision to follow the Wards Cove analysis in
ADEA disparate impact cases. Additionally, this section will review a
few lower court cases applying the Smith decision to demonstrate the
detrimental effects of the RFOA provision and the Wards Cove burdens
on ADEA disparate impact cases. Finally, this section will examine the
Supreme Court's unpersuasive reasoning for providing less protection for
ADEA disparate impact plaintiffs compared to Title VII disparate impact
plaintiffs.
A. The Unreasonableness of the Reasonable Factor Other than Age Ex-
ception
As Justice O'Connor so aptly perceived, any disparate impact
claims "are strictly circumscribed by the RFOA exception" due to the
Smith Court's broad interpretation of the RFOA. 176 Indeed, courts and
commentators opposing the disparate impact theory of recovery under
the ADEA prior to Smith argued that the RFOA exception is inconsistent
with the recognition of disparate impact claims because the motivation
behind employment policies targeted by disparate impact claims: factors
other than age, are just what the RFOA exception permits. 77 Likewise,
commentators who argued against the recognition of disparate impact
174. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45.
175. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
176. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1560 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177. Herbert & Shelton, supra note 10, at 639; Clemons & Bales, supra note 38, at 21; B.
Johnson, supra note 28, at 321.
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claims under the ADEA prior to the Smith decision noted that the RFOA
exception is logically inconsistent with the disparate impact theory. 
178
The Court in Smith disagreed with this interpretation of the RFOA
clause, stressing that the word "reasonable" gives meaning to the clause
and supports recognition of disparate impact claims.1 79  For in such
claims, the RFOA plays its "principal role by precluding liability if the
adverse impact was attributable to a non-age factor that was 'reason-
able."'' 180  However, the Court's over-expansive interpretation of the
RFOA exception in Smith ignores other courts' reasonable interpretations
of the clause, violates statutory interpretation principles, and will allow
employers to escape liability in the majority of disparate impact claims.
Furthermore, the Smith interpretation of the RFOA defense conflicts with
Congress's goal of eliminating arbitrary age discrimination in the work-
place.
First, the Court adopted a novel and significantly broader interpreta-
tion of the RFOA clause rejecting the circuits' long-standing interpreta-
tion of the clause. Prior to Smith, lower courts consistently applied the
business necessity test as a possible defense to employer liability under
the ADEA. 181 Some courts and commentators interpreted the RFOA
exception as a codified business necessity defense. 182 Others, as well as
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and Depart-
ment of Labor (DOL), argued that business necessity or job relatedness
were underlying requirements for reasonableness.
1 83
The business necessity test is the defense to disparate impact claims
under Title VII introduced by the Griggs v. Duke Power Co.184 Court as
the "touchstone" to disparate impact claims. 185 The business necessity
test allows an employer to justify its use of the challenged employment
practice by showing it is job related or a business necessity. 186 The test
178. Herbert & Shelton, supra note 10, at 639 (citing Metz v. Transit Mix, 828 F.2d 1202,
1216-20 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)).
179. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544.
180. Id.
181. See Herbert & Shelton, supra note 10, at 630; see LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 6, at
428.
182. B. Johnson, supra note 28, at 323, 326.
183. See id; 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (2005) (EEOC regulation stating that when an employment
practice which has a disparate impact on older employees is claimed to be based on a 'factor other
than age,' it can only be justified as a business necessity); see also, Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost
of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L.
REv. 229, 302-03 (1990) (Department of Labor stated that to constitute an RFOA, criterion must be
"reasonably necessary for the specific work to be performed" or "shown to have a valid relationship
to job requirements."). Incidentally, the Smith Court claimed deference to the DOL and EEOC in
support of its decision to recognize disparate-impact claims, but glossed over the fact that the DOL
and EEOC recommend a specific interpretation of the RFOA clause which conflicts with the Court's
interpretation of the same clause in Smith. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544, 1560.
184. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
185. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
186. Id.
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then permits the employee to present alternative practices which would
achieve the same legitimate business objective but with less discrimina-
tory impact. 187 However, the Court in Smith chose to defenestrate the
business necessity test, its self-proclaimed "touchstone" to disparate im-
pact recovery, and to replace it perfunctorily with the "reasonableness"
test.188 The Smith Court explained that the RFOA exception does not
require the employer to justify its discriminatory practice as being job-
related or a business necessity, it need only be "reasonable." ' 89 More-
over, according to the Court, the RFOA test, unlike the business neces-
sity test, does not involve inquiry into whether the employer could
achieve its goals without discriminating against older employees. 190
Second, the Smith Court's broad interpretation of the RFOA clause
violates a basic rule of statutory interpretation by rendering another
clause of the ADEA superfluous. Giving effect to all language in a stat-
ute is an elementary rule of statutory interpretation. 19' Given the Court's
RFOA definition, another ADEA exception, § 623(f)(2), would not be
necessary to the statute. Section § 623(f)(2) states that an employer is
not liable under the ADEA if the employers' challenged action or prac-
tice is observing the terms of a bona fide seniority system or employee
benefit plan.192, Certainly, a seniority system and employee benefit plan
are reasonable factors other than age according to the Court's reason-
ableness test. If Congress intended such a broad definition of the RFOA
as the Smith Court adopted, then it would not have needed to include §
623(f)(2) in the ADEA.
Third, the Court failed to acknowledge that its overly broad inter-
pretation of the RFOA clause will provide employers a defense in the
vast majority of disparate impact claims. 193 The Court contended that
while the RFOA defense narrows the scope of employer liability, it does
not preclude disparate impact claims altogether. 194  However, the
Court's new reasonableness test allows an employer to escape liability
from disparate impact claims without requiring the employer to demon-
strate business necessity or job relatedness. 195 Additionally, the reason-
ableness test prevents a plaintiff from presenting evidence that the em-
187. Id. at 658 (citing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)); Clemons &
Bales, supra note 38, at 8.
188. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1546.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 134 (2004).
192. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (2005).
193. See infra Part IIIC discussing how lower courts are applying the RFOA defense to dismiss
ADEA disparate impact claims.
194. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1543-44, 1544 n. 1I ("[I]f Congress intended to prohibit all dispa-
rate-impact claims, it certainly could have done so. For instance, in the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
Congress barred recovery if a pay differential was based 'on any other factor' - reasonable or unrea-
sonable - 'other than sex."')
195. See id. at 1546.
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ployer could achieve its business goals by adopting a less discriminatory
alternative practice.1 96 Moreover, the Court did not propose any limita-
tions to this RFOA test, nor did it offer any factors to judge reasonable-
ness or any examples of what would constitute an unreasonable non-age
factor.
Indeed, the Smith case demonstrates the potential breadth of the new
RFOA exception. The Court in Smith found it reasonable for an em-
ployer, like the City of Jackson, to rely on seniority and rank to calculate
market wage adjustments for lower level employees in order to attract
and retain such employees even if such wage adjustments result in a
higher percentage increase for younger employees.1 97 However, while
the Court admitted the City probably had other less discriminatory alter-
natives, the Court stated that no investigation into such alternatives was
necessary.198
Thus, any "reasonable" justification will suffice to allow an em-
ployer to escape liability for its discriminatory practices. 99 There seems
to be no employer explanation which would not be considered reasonable
under the Smith Court's broad definition of the RFOA clause. Hiring
only less experienced workers for certain positions, company restructure,
and reductions in workforce are all likely to be considered "reasonable"
in light of an employer's need to cut costs, maintain efficiency and com-
pete in its industry. But, perhaps employment practices which are based
on clearly egregious factors would fail the reasonableness test.2°°
For example, the RFOA might not protect an employer who had a
physical fitness requirement for its applicants for accountant positions, as
that would have a disparate impact on older employees and would be an
outrageous employment test given the nature of an accounting posi-
tion.2°  However, if an employer adopts a test or policy and has a rea-
sonable explanation for it, a court would immediately reject the older
employee's disparate impact claim, even if the employer could have
achieved its business goals in another less discriminatory manner.20 2 For
example, the RFOA exception would likely protect an employer who laid
off its highest paid employees due to budgetary concerns, without look-
ing at whether the employer could have adhered to its budget by reducing
expenses other than wages, such as operating or marketing costs and,
thus, lessen the discriminatory impact on older employees.20 3
196. See id.
197. Id. at 1546-47.
198. Id. at 1546.
199. See id.
200. See, e.g., B. Johnson, supra note 28, at 309-10.
201. See id.
202. See, e.g., Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1546.
203. See J. Johnson, supra note 7, at 1406.
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Arguably, the majority of employers today are savvy enough not to
engage in outrageous employment practices such as the physical fitness
requirement for accountant positions. Indeed, commentators suggest that
employers are becoming increasingly sophisticated in dodging ADEA
liability.2°4 Additionally, courts and commentators argue that employers
should not be allowed to adopt policies or practices that adversely impact
older employees without being required to justify the practice (for exam-
ple, by showing a business necessity or job relatedness, or the inability to
adopt a less discriminatory alternative). 205
However, the Court's broad new interpretation of the RFOA de-
fense will hinder a plaintiffs ability to challenge subtle discriminatory
practices (such as layoffs to cut costs) which adversely impact older
workers. An employer may escape liability by justifying its practice with
any reasonable explanation (no business necessity or job relatedness are
required).20 6 Furthermore, the plaintiff does not have the opportunity to
show that the employer could have achieved its goal in a less discrimina-
tory manner.20 7 By severely limiting the disparate impact cause of action
under the ADEA, the Court will effectively frustrate Congress's attempts
to protect older workers from arbitrary age discrimination in the work-
place.20 8
B. Regressing Back to Wards Cove
In addition to its expansive interpretation of the RFOA defense, the
Smith Court held that the burdens of proof and persuasion as defined in
Wards Cove, and long since rejected by Congress as unfair limitations of
Title VII, are now to be applied in ADEA disparate impact cases.20 9
Thus, in order to establish a prima facie case under the ADEA, the plain-
tiff must identify the specific employment practice responsible for creat-
ing the alleged disparate impact and then introduce statistical evidence
204. Minda, supra note 3, at 538-39 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 335
(1995) ("By now.., employers have largely succeeded in purging such slogans as 'you can't teach
an old dog new tricks' from the vocabulary of their supervisory and personnel staffs.")).
205. See J. Johnson, supra note 7, at 1406-08 (arguing that the ADEA must provide protection
for older employees who are downsized by employers attempting to cut costs, and that employers
should be required to justify decisions to impose cost-savings on older workers). See, e.g., Geller v.
Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1033-34 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that defendant was unable to adequately
justify its policy of hiring inexperienced applicants which disproportionately disadvantaged older
applicants and, therefore, was liable under the ADEA).
206. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1546.
207. See id.
208. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. See also Minda, supra note 3, at 512-15
(asserting that opportunistic downsizing of older workers should be eliminated by age and pension
discrimination legislation to avoid rendering legislation, including the ADEA, meaningless. Addi-
tionally, if opportunistic downsizing is left unchecked, it could contribute to the impending Social
Security crisis and the downfall of the American work ethic).
209. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45.
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that the practice adversely impacts older employees.210  Then, the em-
ployer may either refute the plaintiffs statistical evidence or produce
evidence that its challenged practice is based on a reasonable non-age
factor.211 However, the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at
all times.212 So, the plaintiff has the burden to persuade the factfinder
that the employer's justification is unreasonable.213
Ironically, Justice Stevens, author of the plurality opinion in Smith,
wrote a scathing dissent of the majority opinion in Wards Cove for the
decision to impose this burden on the plaintiff.214 Justice Stevens wrote,
"[t]he changes the majority makes today, tipping the scales in favor of
employers, are not faithful to those [ordinary] principles [of fairness]." 215
Justice Stevens' own arguments against the Court's adjustment of bur-
dens of proof in his dissent in Wards Cove are applicable to refute his
opinion in Smith.
In his Wards Cove dissent, Justice Stevens attacked the majority's
redefinition of the employees' burden of proof to establish a prima facie
disparate impact case, calling it unfair and unwarranted.216 Justice Ste-
vens predicted that the majority's requirement that employees isolate
specific employment practices responsible for the statistical disparities
would present serious difficulties for employees.217 Justice Stevens rec-
ognized that employers often consider multiple factors in making their
decisions and it would be nearly impossible to separate and challenge
each factor rather than the decision-making process as a whole.
218
Justice Stevens also asserted in Wards Cove that the employer
should have the burden of proof and persuasion for the defense of busi-
ness necessity in disparate impact cases.219 Following basic common law
pleading procedure, Justice Stevens stressed that the plaintiff has the
burden to persuade the factfinder that the defendant has harmed her, and
the defendant may refute any evidence the plaintiff presents.220 In addi-
tion, the defendant has the option of persuading the factfinder that her act
was justifiable. 22' Depending on which party is asserting a proposition,
the burdens of persuasion shift between the plaintiff and defendant.
222
210. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57 (discussing the prima facie requirements under Title
VII); see also Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1560 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (applying these same require-
ments to the ADEA).
211. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1560 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 662-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 673.
216. Id. at 672-73.
217. See id. at 673 n.19-20.
218. Id. at 672-73 n.19.





DENVER UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
Thus, Justice Stevens concluded, the business necessity defense in dispa-
rate impact cases is a "classic example of an affirmative defense."
223
Indeed, courts interpreted the RFOA defense as an affirmative de-
fense in ADEA disparate impact cases following Griggs.224  Further-
more, prior to Smith, commentators arguing for the recognition of dispa-
rate impact claims under the ADEA interpreted the RFOA exception as
an affirmative defense, based on the construction of the statute.225 Addi-
tionally, commentators recognize that because the employer has greater
access to proof regarding its own policies and practices, the burden of
persuasion for employer defenses to disparate impact claims should be
allocated to the employer.226
However, contrary to basic rules of civil procedure and statutory
construction, the Court in Smith decided to revert back to its obsolete
1989 Wards Cove decision and place what should be the employer's
"weighty" burden,227 squarely on the shoulders of the employee.228 Thus,
rather than requiring the employer to persuade the factfinder that its prac-
tice is based on a reasonable non-age factor, the employee is expected to
persuade the factfinder of the unreasonableness of the non-age factor.
So, in addition to receiving the benefit of the broad RFOA defense
under the ADEA, employers do not even have to persuade the factfinder
of that defense.229 Moreover, in order to establish a prima facie case,
ADEA disparate impact plaintiffs are now responsible for isolating spe-
cific employment practices and presenting statistical evidence that each
practice adversely affects older workers.23° Charging older employees
with both of these procedural burdens adds to the likelihood that em-
ployees' ADEA disparate impact claims will fail.
23t
223. Id. at 670 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c)).
224. See Palochko v. Manville Corp., 21 F.3d 981, 981 (10th Cir. 1994); see Geller, 635 F.2d
at 1032, 1034; see also LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 5, at 428 (stating that the defendant has
the burden of production and persuasion regarding the business necessity test (the predecessor to the
RFOA test)).
225. J. Johnson, supra note 7, at 1402, 1447; see also Mack A. Player, Wards Cove Packing or
Not Wards Cove Packing? That is Not the Question: Some Thoughts on Impact Analysis Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 819, 832-36 (1997) (arguing that the
ADEA's language pertaining to the RFOA exception indicates that procedurally, the RFOA excep-
tion is a defense, and thus the burden must be upon the employer to establish that it acted upon a
reasonable non-age factor).
226. See Jesse A. Whitten, Disparate Impact Doctrine Revisited: Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Antonio, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 383, 396 (1990) (arguing that employers should bear the
burden of persuasion on the business necessity defense to Title VII disparate impact claims because
they have greater access to information about their business practices).
227. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. See id at 659 (majority opinion).
229. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45 (adopting Wards Cove analysis in ADEA cases).
230. See id.
231. See Niall A. Paul, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio: The Supreme Court s Disparate
Treatment of the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 127, 162-63 (arguing
that the Wards Cove decision including the statistical evidence requirement, business justification
test, and shifting the burden of persuasion of the business necessity issue to plaintiffs threatens the
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C. ADEA Disparate Impact Plaintiffs Losing in the Lower Courts
Lower courts applying the Smith decision have utilized the Wards
Cove plaintiff burdens, and the over-expansive interpretation of the
RFOA provision to eliminate ADEA plaintiffs' disparate impact
claims.232 These courts have consistently dismissed ADEA disparate
impact claims in the initial pleading stages either because the plaintiff
failed to meet the statistical evidence requirement, or because the defen-
dant pleaded a 'reasonable factor other than age' (RFOA) defense, or
both.233 Indeed, since the Smith decision, only one ADEA disparate im-
pact plaintiff has survived summary judgment;234 and no ADEA plaintiff
has prevailed under a disparate impact theory of recovery.235
In Slattery v. Peerless Importers,236 the court found the plaintiffs
ADEA disparate impact claim was without merit because the employer
based its challenged policy on a reasonable non-age factor.237  In
Slattery, the plaintiff, a salesperson employed by the defendant whole-
sale wine distributor, alleged that the defendant's policy to hire new
salespersons in its new division, rather than allowing existing salespeople
to transfer to that division, adversely impacted older employees.238 The
new division had exclusive distribution rights for a lucrative brand of
viability of Title VII plaintiffs' disparate impact claims); see also Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that
Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1093, 1190 (1993) (criticizing the Wards Cove decision for its
"revisionist treatment of the burden of proof" and its requirement that plaintiffs identify specific
employment practices).
232. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
233. Plaintiff failed to isolate a specific facially neutral employment practice and present
evidence showing a statistically significant disparate impact on older employees: See Mihalik v.
Expressjet Airlines, No. 3:04CV258 RV/EMT, 2005 WL 1787350, at *3 (N.D. Fla. July 27, 2005);
Aylward v. Hyatt Corp., No. 03 C 6097, 2005 WL 1910904, at *14-15 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2005);
Schaller v. Donelson Air Conditioning Co., No. 3:04-0545, 2005 WL 1868769, at *8 (M.D. Tenn.
Aug. 4, 2005); Chavarria v. Despachos Del Notre, Inc., No. CIV.A. L-03-96, 2005 WL 1515472, at
*6 n. I1 (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2005); Ackerman v. Home Depot, Inc., No. CIV.A. 304CV0058N, 2005
WL 1313429, at *5 (N.D. Tex. May 31, 2005). Employer based its decision on what the court
considered to be a reasonable factor other than age: See Slattery v. Peerless Imp., Inc., No. 04 CV
0275(JG), 2005 WL 1527681, at *7-8 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2005); Duggan v. Orthopaedic Institute of
Ohio, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 853, 862 (N.D. Ohio 2005); Wilson v. MVM, Inc., No. CIV.A.03-4514,
2005 WL 1231968, at * 18 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 2005). Plaintiff failed to isolate specific practice and
employer's motivation constituted a RFOA: See Durante v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 03-56255, 2005
WL 1799416, at *3, *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2005) (not selected for pulication); Rizzo v. PPL Serv.
Corp., No. Civ.A. 03-5779, Civ.A. 03-5780, Civ.A. 03-5781, 2005 WL 1397217, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
June 10, 2005); Townsend v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No.04-C-563-C, 2005 WL 1389197, at *13-14
(W.D. Wis. June 13, 2005).
234. As of Aug. 26, 2005, Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 03-2200-JWL, 2005 WL
1801605, at *1 (D. Kan. July 29, 2005), is the only ADEA disparate impact case in which the court
denied a defendant's motion for summary judgment. However, the Williams court misapplied the
Wards Cove standard and stated that the employer had the burden to plead and prove the RFOA
defense and refused to consider the employers proffered factors other than age under this motion for
summary judgment. Id. at *3.
235. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text. These are all the reported decisions
through Aug. 26, 2005 which cited Smith and involved ADEA disparate impact claims.
236. No. 04 CV 0275(JG), 2005 WL 1527681 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2005).
237. Slattery, 2005 WL 1527681, at *8.
238. Id. at *1, *2, *7.
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wine which previously accounted for 30% of the plaintiffs commission
income.239 The court found that the employer's allegation that it prohib-
ited its salespersons from transferring to reassure its other suppliers that
an experienced sales staff would continue to support them constituted a
RFOA; and, thus, precluded the plaintiff's disparate impact claim. 40
The Slattery court noted that the Smith decision narrowed the scope
of employer liability under the ADEA from what previously existed in
the Second Circuit.24' The court further explained that the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the RFOA requires only an employer's showing
that its disputed decision was reasonable.242 This reasonableness test, the
Slattery court pointed out, is much easier for an employer to satisfy com-
pared to the business necessity test which was the law of the Second Cir-
cuit prior to Smith.24 3
Additionally, in Townsend v. Weyerhaeuser Co.,244 the court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on a disparate im-
pact claim with the assistance of both the Wards Cove plaintiff burden
and the RFOA provision.245 In Townsend, the plaintiff was an adminis-
trative assistant employed at the defendant paper mill company who lost
24her job as a result of the defendant's reorganization. 46 A total of eight
employees were laid off as a result of the defendant's reorganization; and
seven of the eight employees were over forty years of age.247 The court
held that the plaintiff did not isolate a specific practice which was re-
sponsible for the observed statistical disparity.248
However, even if the plaintiff showed that the defendant's reduction
in force (RIF) had a significant adverse effect on employees over forty,
the court could still grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant
based on the RFOA provision.249 The employer decided to terminate
older employees to relieve itself of the burden of those employees' high
salary or health care costs. 250 The court found that saving salary and
healthcare costs constitute reasonable factors other than age and, thus,
the employer would not be liable under the ADEA.251
In addition to the dismal results of plaintiffs' attempts to plead dis-
parate impact cases since Smith, litigators' commentaries highlight the
239. Id at *1-*2.
240. Id at *8.
241. Id. at *7.
242. Id. at *8.
243. See id. at *7.
244. No. 04-C-563-C, 2005 WL 1389197 (W.D. Wis. June 13, 2005).
245. See Townsend, 2005 WL 1389197, at *1.
246. Id at *1, *6.
247. Id at *6.
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difficulties they expect plaintiffs will face in ADEA disparate impact
cases. 252 Litigators lament that "the existence of the [RFOA] defense
curtails disparate impact liability., 253  Additionally, litigators observe
that as a result of Smith, an employer may now adopt a policy to hire less
experienced (usually younger) employees and justify it as a cost-saving
mechanism to take advantage of the RFOA defense.2 54 Whereas under
the business necessity test prior to Smith, an employer's assertion of cost-
saving alone would not allow it to escape liability under ADEA disparate
impact claims.255
In short, no plaintiff has been successful in a disparate impact case
under the ADEA since Smith. Courts and litigators alike have com-
mented on how the Supreme Court's interpretation of the ADEA in
Smith, particularly the RFOA provision, has made it extremely difficult
for an ADEA plaintiff to succeed under a disparate impact theory.25 6
Further, a review of the initial lower court cases applying Smith indicates
that the Smith decision has made it nearly impossible for plaintiffs to
prevail on a disparate impact theory of recovery under the ADEA.
D. Discriminating Against ADEA Plaintiffs
According to the Court, the ADEA seeks to "broadly prohibit[] ar-
bitrary discrimination in the workplace based on age. 257 In addition, the
nearly identical language of the ADEA and Title VII supports a pre-
sumption that Congress intended to provide similar protection for em-
ployees against the types of discrimination included in both statutes.258
Commentators argue that due to the language and format similarities of
Title VII and ADEA, the ideal solution would be "to allow for co-
extensive causes of action and protection for covered plaintiffs under
[both] the respective acts. 259  Unfortunately, the Court's decision in
Smith does not further Congress's goal of broadly prohibiting age dis-
crimination, nor does it provide protection for older employees similar to
the Title VII protections. Instead, the Smith Court highlighted the textual
differences rather than the similarities between the two statutes, and arbi-
trarily adopted an interpretation which will result in significantly less
protection for employees subjected to age discrimination.
The Court's main reasons for affording employees less protection
under the ADEA than under Title VII included: (1) the existence of the
252. See Slattery, 2005 WL 1527681, at *7; LOuis A. JACOBS & ANDREW J. RUZICHO,
LITIGATING AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES § 2:8 (2005), available at LITADCS § 2:8 (Westlaw).
253. See JACOBS & RUZICHO, supra note 252, § 2:8.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See id.; Slattery, 2005 WL 1527681, at *7.
257. TWA v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120 (1985) (emphasis added); Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 577 (1978) (emphasis added).
258. Smith, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1541 (2005).
259. B. Johnson, supra note 28, at 343.
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RFOA clause in the ADEA but not Title VII; (2) Congress not mention-
ing the ADEA in its 1991 amendments; and (3) age discrimination's in-
herent difference from the other types of discrimination. 260  These rea-
sons are unpersuasive.
First, the mere existence of the RFOA clause in the ADEA but not
in Title VII does not support the Court's broad interpretation of the
RFOA clause (and narrowing of employer liability). Courts prior to
Smith were able to apply the RFOA defense without significantly nar-
rowing employers' liability under the ADEA.261 These courts utilized
the more stringent business necessity test and allowed plaintiffs to pre-
sent less discriminatory alternatives.262 Furthermore, this argument is
tautological given that the Court first selected a broad interpretation of
the RFOA defense and then used it as reasoning to conclude that em-
ployer liability should be more narrow under the ADEA.
Second, many commentators have opined and drawn a range of dif-
ferent conclusions about the meaning of Congress's failure to mention
the ADEA in its 1991 amendments.263 Some argue that Congress may
not have addressed the ADEA for the simple reason that Wards Cove
was a Title VII case, not an ADEA case.2 4 Others argue that Congress
actually intended for courts to follow the 1991 amendments for similar
statutes such as the ADEA.265 Still other commentators question whether
Congress even considered how the 1991 amendments could apply in the
context of the ADEA.266
Third, just because age discrimination is inherently different from
racial discrimination, for example, does not mean older employees
should not be shielded from needless discrimination too. In Smith, the
Court noted that "age, unlike race or other classifications protected by
Title VII, not uncommonly has relevance to an individual's capacity to
engage in certain types of employment., 267 While this is unquestionably
true, it does not support a ruling leaving older workers vulnerable to age
discrimination which has nothing to do with their ability to perform their
job. If an older employee cannot perform the job, then the employer may
either refuse to hire her according to the BFOQ exception, or terminate
her according to the good cause exception without incurring ADEA li-
260. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45.
261. See supra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
263. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 5, at 420-21.
264. See Eglit, supra note 231, at 1174-75.
265. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 5, at 421 (A House Judiciary Committee report
stated that the laws modeled after Title VI1 should be interpreted consistently with the 1991 amend-
ments. However others contend that the House Committee's interpretation should not be followed
because it was not part of the Senate Bill which was adopted.).
266. See Eglit, supra note 231, at 1168-70.
267. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545.
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ability. 268 Finally, while older workers have not been exposed to a life-
time of discrimination like racial minorities, they still deserve freedom
from workplace discrimination.
CONCLUSION
A cursory review of the Court's decision in Smith v. City of Jack-
son,269 leads to the assumption of a victory for older employees. How-
ever, closer scrutiny reveals that although the Court held that disparate
impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA, its expansive interpreta-
tion of the RFOA exception, and its use of the plaintiff burdens in Wards
Cove Packing v. Atonio270 will in effect preclude the majority of dispa-
rate impact claims. Indeed, not one plaintiff has prevailed in an ADEA
disparate impact case since Smith.2 7 1 Perhaps Congress will intervene
yet again to express its discontent at leaving workers exposed to arbitrary
discrimination. However, if Congress does not act accordingly, the
Court's ruling in Smith will eviscerate the main purpose of the ADEA
and leave elder workers without recourse against insidious age discrimi-
nation in the workplace.
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